**ONE MEMBER SEIZING AN OPPORTUNITY!**

**A CASE STUDY IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF**

**PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE[[1]](#footnote-1)**

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***Abstract:***

2 December 2024 will mark the 30th anniversary of the last sitting day of the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales in the 50th Parliament (1991-1995).

The general election held in May 1991 resulted in a hung Legislative Assembly. This provided the political circumstances for the negotiation of a *Memorandum of Understanding for a Charter of Reform* (the Charter) between the government and key independent members.

The Charter aimed “to provide stable Government” in return for broader accountability reforms “to enhance Parliamentary democracy”.

Practice in the Legislative Assembly prior to 1991 gives the context that shaped the motivation of one member who, at a crucial time, through The Charter seized the opportunity to consolidate and transform parliamentary practice.

The Charter frames this case study analysing the accountability measures implemented, especially amendments to the standing orders and the revival of certain parliamentary practice. The analysis will show how the Charter curbed, if not reversed, the tide of executive dominance of parliament and why “procedure matters”.

Looking back at parliamentary proceedings and practice since those amendments to the standing orders of the Legislative Assembly, after 30 years most remain. The evidence is that the changes have strengthened the parliamentary avenues available to members to hold the executive to account as well as to directly raise issues in the House. Not only have those procedural changes transformed practice for the better but have also had an ongoing positive impact on Legislative Assembly culture.

**The Importance of Parliamentary Practice**

In the article *Playing by the Rules*[[2]](#footnote-2), Philip Norton, the Director of the Centre for Legislative Studies, and a Member of the House of Lords, argues that “procedure matters”. With a general perception of a decline in parliament, Norton comments that it is only in relatively recent times has scholarly attention been given to parliament. One consequence has been that well entrenched parliamentary procedure has not always been fully utilised as a constraint on governments.

Norton provides examples from the House of Commons as to how the parliamentary rules have the capacity to be a “constraining hand on government”. He states that details matter and goes on to highlight examples of significant legislation falling on procedural motions.

Norton adds that while long established, standing orders are adapted and amended over time. He concludes that rules may not constrain government as some would like but at the same time, they are a constraint.

The Constitution of New South Wales provides the authority for the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council to each “prepare and adopt” rules and orders to “regulate’ the conduct and proceedings of the Houses.[[3]](#footnote-3) The scope of the power is limited to matters internal to the Houses under the Constitution or other Acts permitted to be regulated by the standing orders, such as: orderly conduct; how the Houses “confer, correspond and communicate with each other”; the manner of publication of certain business; and the passage of legislation. However, it is with the stipulation that once adopted by the House the standing rules and orders be laid before the Governor for approval.

The Constitution does not dictate how the Houses will conduct their functions. Nor are standing orders and practice set in stone. As one of the functions of parliaments is to hold the executive to account, it follows that the power to make Standing Rules and Orders is important to the doctrine of responsible government. Rules and practice have evolved over time to redress any short comings in procedure, to facilitate new procedure and to meet the challenges of changed circumstances and reflect the values, diversity of generational change in House membership.

Arising from the hung House, the Legislative Assembly had its own opportunity to transform practice to strengthen the ability of members to make the executive more responsible to parliament. This paper, as a case study, highlights the Assembly of the 50th Parliament (1991-1995). The focus will be on the outcomes arising from the amendments to the standing orders. With the perspective of 30 years, those amendments have had an ongoing positive impact to demonstrate how procedure matters.

**John Hatton**

The general election in 1991 for the 50th Parliament resulted in a hung Assembly. The Greiner Government retained power but lost its absolute majority. The result prompted the government to explore assorted options to continue in office, including negotiating with independent Tony Windsor and the three 'unaligned' independents (John Hatton, Clover Moore and Peter Macdonald) who held out longer.

I have elevated John Hatton as the “one member” referred to in the title of this paper. Hatton was into his seventh and last term, Moore only her second term and Macdonald his first. This does not diminish the roles of Moore and Macdonald. For without them Hatton would not have had any negotiating power. Indeed, following the loss of a seat at a byelection, in early 1992 the government needed two of those three to obtain a majority on the floor of the House.

Hatton was a member of the Legislative Assembly from 1973 to 1995. He started out in community activity as a member of the South Coast Villages Progress Association, elected to Shoalhaven Shire Council, and later become Shire President.

Frustrated at ministers dismissing representations made by the council he decided to contest the 1968 general election, challenging the incumbent who was Minister for Conservation. He reduced the minister’s majority. At his third attempt Hatton was successful when the minister chose not to seek re-election, and the Opposition strategically did not contest the seat.[[4]](#footnote-4)

The obstacles, difficulties, and technicalities Hatton faced when running for election and in office strengthened his resolve to:

…follow small procedural details of the political process,

knowing that to ignore them would restrict his freedom to

act or even silence him.[[5]](#footnote-5)

This was to serve Hatton well once in parliament. As the only independent he was an outsider and took the opportunity to understand parliamentary procedure:

Increased knowledge on parliamentary procedures allowed

him greater influence in Parliament.[[6]](#footnote-6)

In those years, the atmosphere of the Assembly was combative with ‘no quarter asked, none given’. For instance, in the year of Hatton’s election, the Opposition dubbed the Leader of the House “Stainless Steel”[[7]](#footnote-7) for his proclivity to apply the guillotine on the consideration of government legislation. The Assembly certainly lived up to its then sobriquet as the ‘Bear Pit’.

Hatton forged and enhanced a reputation for integrity and probity. Shaped by his near 20 years’ experience as an independent in a House dominated by Liberal-Country, Labor and Liberal-National governments, he questioned how the House worked and how it could be improved. He noted the limited opportunities. To him:

it seemed that parliamentary procedures were aimed

directly at silencing those in opposition to government

and particularly those outside the party structure.[[8]](#footnote-8)

Prime examples being non-answers in question time, questions on notice not answered at all, the use of the gag and the guillotine and the lack of opportunities for backbenchers in the House.

Presciently, ten days before the 1991 election, when asked what he would do in the case of a hung House.[[9]](#footnote-9) Hatton’s answer was an outline of the principles which would form the basis of the Charter of Reform.

**The Charter of Reform**

When negotiating with the government the three independents did not miss their opportunity! In return for voting with the government on appropriation, supply, and no confidence motions (not involving corruption or gross maladministration), agreement was reached on a *Memorandum of Understanding for a Charter of Reform* (the Charter).[[10]](#footnote-10)

The preamble stated the aim of the Charter was “to enhance Parliamentary democracy and open and accountable Government in New South Wales”.[[11]](#footnote-11) To achieve this, the Charter proposed several major accountability reforms, including:

* entrenching fixed four-year parliamentary terms in the Constitution
* entrenching the independence of the judiciary in the Constitution
* reforms strengthening the independence of both the Auditor General and Ombudsman
* amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, and
* enacting Protected Disclosures legislation.

The Charter also stated concerns that:

the Legislature and the procedures of the Legislative

Assembly provide too few opportunities for real participation

by Members in the shaping and enactment of legislation,

and

that much more can and should be done to enhance the

ability of Members to make the Executive Government ….

more accountable to the Legislature.[[12]](#footnote-12)

To redress the imbalance the Charter set out many proposals for sessional orders to trial with a view to incorporating them in the Standing Rules and Orders. These proposals set in train the transformation of Assembly practice to both improve the capacity of the Assembly to scrutinise the government and increase opportunities for members. The Charter is the basis of this case study in a transformation of parliamentary practice.

As well as incorporating the amendments sought by the ‘unaligned’ independents into the standing orders as well as translating the standing orders into plain English.

**Protection of the Independence of the Parliament**

The first principle in the Charter stated that the independence of the parliament was fundamental to ensuring ‘the accountability of Executive Government to the Parliament’. The key elements immediately below, implemented with statutory authority, had consequential impacts on the standing orders and thereby shaped parliamentary practice to augment responsible government.

Fixed Four Year Terms

On the day the Memorandum of Understanding was signed the government introduced the Constitution (Fixed Terms Parliament) Amendment Bill and the Constitution (Fixed Terms Parliament) Special Provisions Bill. This legislation fixed the date of the next and subsequent general elections to be held on the fourth Saturday in March every fourth year, provided for a ‘baton change’ as a test for an alternative government should a vote of no confidence be carried, and, entrenched the provisions in the Constitution Act.

The significance of the bills, as stated by The Hon Tim Moore, the Leader of the House, when introducing the bills and in reply to close the second reading debate was:

* removing the capacity for the Government of the day “to manipulate the timing of an election to suit its own political purposes”[[13]](#footnote-13) and
* a shift along the continuum “from the present dominance of the Executive” to greater accountability of the executive to the parliament.[[14]](#footnote-14)

Constitutional Recognition of the Independence of the Presiding Officers and the Manner of the Election of the Speaker

As the office of Speaker is in the fiat of the government the office might be seen as the consolation prize for someone overlooked for ministerial appointment. There had also been criticism of partiality shown by some Speakers. To overcome the concerns, the Constitution was amended to recognise the Presiding Officers, being the Speaker and the President of the Legislative Council, “as independent and impartial representatives” of the parliament to the executive. This was reinforced with a new section 31B to provide the manner of election for the Speaker be by secret ballot.

The constitutional recognition of the Speaker as independent and impartial as well as the method of election is significant for recognising the position as above politics. Election by secret ballot also provides a veil for a potential cross-party vote for the speakership.

Power to Veto and Parliamentary Counsel Services

Amendments to the parliamentary oversight committees’ legislation introduced the requirement for ministers to refer to the relevant oversight committee the proposed appointee to certain independent offices (such as the Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption and the Ombudsman among others). The committees now consider the nomination with the power to veto the proposed appointment. This is a further moderating consideration for the executive when deciding on candidates for such positions.

All private members were granted access to the resources of the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel to prepare their bills, previously the exclusive resource of the executive. Together with subsequent procedural changes in the routine of general business, there was a proliferation of private members’ bills. This enabled non-executive members to place issues and policy proposals before the House. It forced the executive to consider its own response to such bills and on occasion subsequently introduce its own legislation.

**Transformation of Practice**

The priority elements identified for the transformation of Legislative Assembly practice were:

* estimates committees
* question time
* questions on notice, and
* broader opportunities for private members.

Estimates Committees

Debate on the annual Appropriation Bill in the Legislative Assembly had become a stage for set piece speeches not only by the Treasurer but from the Leader of the Opposition in reply, ministers, shadow ministers and the parochial nature of private members’ contributions. While the opportunity to consider and closely examine the detail of the budget estimates for each ministry had become increasingly inadequate.

To address this, a sessional order provided that during the second reading debate on the Appropriation Bill, a minister *may* move a motion to appoint estimates committees for the purpose of examining and reporting on the proposed expenditure for each minister.

The Legislative Assembly appointed estimates committees in each year of the 50th Parliament. Estimates committees of the Assembly met jointly with its counterpart Legislative Council estimates committee and allocated 3 hours to question each minister on their portfolios.

The creation of estimates committees enhanced the parliament’s ability to scrutinise the government beyond the second reading debate on the Budget. At estimates committee hearings members can directly quiz ministers together with senior departmental officers to drill down seeking explanations of expenditure in the past year and details of proposed expenditure for the coming year. The sessional order set the consideration of the report from each estimates committee with the relevant clause of the Appropriation Bill during the committee of the whole stage.

While the provision remains in the Assembly standing orders, the Assembly has not appointed estimates committees since. This has not been to the detriment of responsible government as the consideration of the budget estimates is now undertaken by the estimates committees of the Legislative Council over at least two rounds each year.

Question Time

Question Time is the most publicly visible means of holding the executive to account in the House. However, it was considered not to be working effectively as: question time had a hard cap of 45 minutes; ministers answers were not limited by time; questions could be answered in any manner so long as it was largely relevant to the subject of the question; and, ministers had got into the habit of giving longer answers to ‘Dorothy Dix’ questions set up for government backbenchers and dismissive short shrift to questions asked by the opposition. Also, considerable time was lost regularly lost from question time as it was the only time the opposition could move for the consideration of a motion. The time taken to establish the urgency of a motion and the division came out of the 45 minutes. These question time practices decreased the already limited opportunities to hold the Government to account, making it ripe for reform.

Sessional orders nullified time wasting to maximise the time available for questions, thereby strengthening the House’s ability to hold the government to account. While question time remained at 45 minutes it had to continue until the answering (*not the asking*) of a minimum of ten questions. There is also provision for one supplementary question, arising out of the answer per question time, but only by the member who asked the original question. However, the question is to count as one of the ten questions.

To prevent the loss of further time, the moving of suspension motions was prohibited during questions. As from time to time the Government had also hijacked question time, the convention that the Leader of the Opposition receive the call to ask the first question at question time was formalised.

Questions on Notice

As there was no compulsion for ministers to answer questions on notice, a particular source of frustration for John Hatton and the opposition, a sizeable number of questions on notice went unanswered or answered in such an untimely manner that rendered the information dated.

Accordingly, the standing order was amended to mandate that answers to questions on notice be submitted within 35 *calendar* days after the question was first published. Previously unlimited, there was a trade-off to limit the number of questions that members could lodge each sitting day: four per sitting day for the Leader of the Opposition and three per sitting day for other members.

In addition, answers not submitted by the due day, the Speaker on the next sitting day is to inform the House and call on the relevant Minister to explain to the House the reason for non-compliance. The embarrassment of being called to account in the House has been a big incentive for ministers to lodge answers in time.

Broader Opportunities for Private Members

John Hatton’s long experience as a private member made him acutely aware of the lack of opportunities for all backbench members, especially the then procedural roadblocks within general business (i.e. non-government business). These new procedural pathways are:

* debates on motions for urgent consideration and discussion of matters of public importance
* rearranging general business to Thursday mornings
* private members’ legislation, and
* debating the reports of parliamentary committees.

Provision for motions for urgent consideration and matters of public importance were included in the House’s routine of business to replace previous problematic practice. These two procedures were an opportunity to hold the executive to account by raising issues and debating policies. More so by non-government members. However, these procedures proved even more problematic in a government majority House with urgent motions monopolised by members of the government.

By moving general business from Thursday afternoons to Thursday mornings significantly more time became available for private members. Time was set for the consideration of all categories of private members’ business, including to enable the potential passage of non-government bills. Indeed, in the 50th Parliament 16 of the private members’ bills introduced in the Assembly passed both Houses.

There was a new procedure for a weekly debate to take note of the reports of a greater number of parliamentary committees. Take note debates provide members with an opportunity to put the case to the executive on whether to adopt the committee recommendations or not. After the 50th Parliament, the take note debate was supplemented with the requirement for the government respond to committee reports.

**Reform of the Legislative Process**

Opposition and independent members had long complained about legislation “rammed” through the House by the executive without adequate scrutiny, debate, or the consequential consideration of amendments. To address this, there were three new procedural measures.

Suspension of Standing Orders

It was routine for governments to suspend standing orders, use closure motions (the gag) and the allocation of time for debate (also known as the guillotine) to maintain control of the House, manage the legislative programme and to curtail debate. Practice that is the antithesis of the principles of government accountability to the House!

While the gag and guillotine provisions remained untouched, there was an amendment to the standing order in relation to the suspension of standing orders. By practice, suspension motions were exclusively with the numbers of the government. A new sessional order provided any member, *including for ministers*, could move a suspension motion but with the constraint of requiring the leave (that is unanimous consent) of the House.

This was a fundamental redress in the balance of power between the House and the executive. It placed a strong restraint on the government by preventing the abuse of the suspension procedure to ‘ride roughshod’ over the House as any one individual member could deny leave. It required the executive to consult and make the case for the necessity of each suspension motion for the pre-requisite leave. With the return of a majority government in the 51st Parliament an amendment to this standing order restored the government’s ability to move for the suspension of standing orders at any time *without* seeking leave.

While the restraint of leave is no longer in the standing orders its impact has contributed to a cultural shift in the way governments use the suspension procedure as mentioned below under “Over Time”.

Legislation Committees

There was a new provision to appoint legislation committees. Whereby, after the second reading, which is the adoption of the principle, the minister may refer a bill to a legislation committee for inquiry. This is distinct from referring a bill to a select committee before the second reading. The remit of legislation committees is to consider amendments to the bill and to report back within six months. The House considers any amendments during the consideration in detail stage, then known as committee of the whole. Crucially, upon request from the committee, the minister having portfolio carriage of the bill is to provide the committee with “drafting and support services”.

This potential procedural stage enhances legislative scrutiny through committee inquiry into the legislative intentions of the executive. Through consulting key stakeholders, receiving submissions and taking evidence a legislation committee could recommend amendments to the bill.

During the 50th Parliament, 12 bills and their cognate bills were referred to legislation committees. This resulted in some substantive reports, constructive amendments and even ‘dissenting reports’.[[15]](#footnote-15) Legislation committees have not been used since.

Unproclaimed Legislation

A particular annoyance for John Hatton were Acts or parts of Acts that had commencement provisions of “on a date to be proclaimed”, rather than upon on Assent or a specified date. Waiting for proclamation may be for valid reasons, such as to ensure the administrative mechanisms are in place to support the operations of the Act. Or, at times for political purposes. Undue delay is also contrary to the wishes of the parliament having passed the legislation. Hatton was also concerned about the lack of transparency when navigating through the maze of legislation to identifying those provisions yet to commence.

A sessional order, later incorporated into the standing orders, requires the executive to forward to the Speaker a list of legislation or parts of legislation remaining unproclaimed 90 days after assent. The list is tabled on the second sitting day of a new session and then updated for tabling each subsequent 15th sitting day.

**Revival of Certain Procedures**

The absence of a government majority in the Legislative Assembly not only presented opportunities for the transformation of practice. A clear illustration of Norton’s contention that “procedure matters” was a revival in the use of existing standing orders to hold the government to account.

Amendments to Bills

Moving amendments to bills in the Legislative Assembly has at times fallen out of favour with shadow ministers who use the refrain that the opposition reserved the right to move amendments in the Legislative Council. During the 50th Parliament not only was there an increase in the number of amendments proposed to government legislation by the independents, the opposition and even the government, 75% of the proposed amendments were carried.[[16]](#footnote-16) Rather than impeding the government it shows that the House made effective use of the standing orders to shape legislation.

Papers Returned to Order

The opposition also came across a standing order for the Assembly to order ministers to table papers. It had been dormant since the 1920s. Motions agreeing to the call for papers to scrutinise executive decisions included: the tendering process for certain Water Board projects; the NSW Agent General in London; the transfer of the Royal Agricultural Society to Homebush Bay; and lead pollution in the Hunter Valley. The Legislative Council has since used its return to order power on a regular basis.

Expansion in the Use of Committees

In addition to the work of legislation committees, estimates committees and the new veto power of statutory based committees referred to above, the executive was scrutinised through a sizeable increase in the number of select committees appointed. Committee inquiries were conducted into important issues such as gun law reform, the government’s home funding scheme, public sector superannuation, the Sydney Water Board, motor vehicle emissions, lead pollution and bushfires.[[17]](#footnote-17) Many of these committees were given very tight reporting deadlines by the House. In response the Legislative Assembly administration created a Committees Office and significantly increased the number of staff to service these committees.

In 1992 the Tamworth Tourist Information Centre Bill, a private bill promoted by Tamworth City Council, passed. This bill was the first private bill to have originated in the Assembly since 1910. This procedure opened the bill to a process of community consultation and parliamentary scrutiny through a select committee. The government supported the bill as it had intentions of regaining the seat. Indeed, after the committee reported back the government facilitated passage of the remaining stages of the bill as government business.

**The Standing Orders**

One of the longer-term expectations under the “Reform of the Procedures” was that the procedural elements to enhance government accountability would be trialled for inclusion in the standing orders. The transformation of practice during the 50th Parliament concluded with the “complete overhaul of the Standing Orders of the Legislative Assembly”[[18]](#footnote-18).

The Speaker and the Clerks-at-the-Table undertook the task of incorporating the trialled sessional orders into the standing orders, as well as translating what some considered the impenetrable language of procedure into “plain” English for clearer understanding and use by members. One former member had described to me the language of the standing orders and procedure as “Clerks’ mumbo jumbo”.

The proposed new standing orders adopted by the Assembly on 2 December 1994 were presented to the Governor and approved on 12 December, more than one hundred years after the previous edition approved in 1894.

**Over Time**

While it is open for a majority government to amend the standing orders at any time, the transformation of practice in the 50th Parliament has over time provided a “constraining hand” on government as well as strengthening the guard rails for responsible government. Most of the reforms continue as unquestioned routine proceedings; some have evolved with use after not having worked as originally intended; some procedures have become dormant; while a few were reversed when a majority government was formed. Overall, parliamentary mechanisms remain available to members to raise issues in the House and to hold the executive to account.

Beyond the procedural reforms, the Charter expressed the hope:

“the changes will assist in evolving conventions which

will ensure that consultation on major issues becomes

the practice for future Governments.”[[19]](#footnote-19)

The reforms have provided a procedural compass for a cultural shift in “the operations of and attitudes in the Assembly”.[[20]](#footnote-20) In this regard change is discernible, reinforced by the procedural expectations and culture brought in with each wave of new members.

Overall, it is evident Governments have been mindful to not abuse the use of procedure. Motions to suspend standing orders are now flagged with members rather than used to ambush. Now the vast majority of suspension motions are resolved without division.

While the Charter deemed the complexities of the gag and the guillotine too difficult to rewrite for the standing orders, they are now rarely resorted to.

Use of the guillotine has fallen out of favour completely. From the 51st Parliament, notices for the “allocation of time for discussion” on legislation, as the procedural euphemism for the guillotine in the standing orders, were given on 18 occasions. Of those notices, the guillotine was moved 11 times. They were between June 1995 and June 1997[[21]](#footnote-21), within two years of John Hatton leaving parliament. The most ‘recent’ notices, more than 20 years ago, in June and November 2003 were not triggered. This is a significant marker for responsible government with legislation not “rammed” through cutting off all remaining debate by using the guillotine.

Even the gag has fallen out of use. The most recent occasions debate on government legislation has been closured was eight times between September 2008 and March 2014. This reflects a cultural shift on the part of governments as well as an awareness of the risk of potential opposition payback with obstructionism at a later stage.

Steven Reynolds noted in his article *The Role of Parliament: Handbrake or Oiling the Wheels of Good Government*,[[22]](#footnote-22) the Charter as an agreement was not legally binding. He makes a comparison with the slightly earlier agreement, the Accord of 1988-1992, made between the Government and the Greens in Tasmania. He cites Haward and Larmour that many regard the Accord “as having failed because of lack goodwill on both sides.”

Unlike Tasmania, the Charter in New South Wales provided both stable minority government and in return a transformation of practice. The motivation of the government may simply have been political pragmatism however, from my observation and the second reading speech of Tim Moore it reflects positively on the then government for carrying through on its side of the agreement.

The Charter was mindful of balancing the right of the Government to govern (“within the doctrine of the separation of powers”) against enhancing responsible government. This paper has focused on the amendments to the standing orders and their impact on parliamentary practice and shaping procedural culture. Implementation of the Charter demonstrates Norton’s argument that procedure does indeed matter.

1. This paper expands on the post ‘*Parliamentary Procedure and Responsible Government*’ contributed to the online book forum, Benjamin B. Saunders, *‘Responsible Government and the Australian Constitution: A Government for a Sovereign People’*, Hart Publishing, 2023. Accessed at: https://www.auspublaw.org/blog/2024/6/parliamentary-procedure-and-responsible-government-responsible-government-and-the-australian-constitution-book-forum. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Philip Norton, *‘Playing by the Rules: The Constraining Hand of Parliamentary Procedure’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, Volume 7, issue 3,* 2001, pp. 13-33. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. *Constitution Act (No. 32) 1902* (NSW) s 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Ruth Richmond, *The Little Bloke: an authorised biography of John Hatton, OA*, Master of Arts research thesis, School of History and Politics, University of Wollongong, 2007. Chapter 2: “Making the Politician”. Accessed at: http://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/666 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Richmond, *The Little Bloke*, p. 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Richmond, *The Little Bloke*, p. 63. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Frank Walker, *NSW Parliamentary Debates*, Legislative Assembly, 23 November 1973, p. 328 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Richmond, *The Little Bloke*, p. 65. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Richmond, *The Little Bloke*, pp. 85-86. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. *Charter of Reform*, October 1991. Accessed at: [https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/researchpapers/documents/minority-governments-in-australia-texts-of-accor/3 nsw 1991.pdf](https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/researchpapers/documents/minority-governments-in-australia-texts-of-accor/3%20nsw%201991.pdf) [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. *Charter of Reform*, p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *Charter of Reform*, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. <https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Hansard/Pages/HansardFull.aspx#/DateDisplay/HANSARD-1323879322-459/HANSARD-1323879322-95550>. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. <https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Hansard/Pages/HansardFull.aspx#/DateDisplay/HANSARD->1323879322-815/HANSARD-1323879322-95597. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. David Clune and Gareth Griffith, *Decision and Deliberation: The Parliament of New South Wales 1856-2003*, The Federation Press, 2006, p. 547. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. David Clune and Gareth Griffith, Decision and Deliberation: The Parliament of New South Wales 1856-2003, The Federation Press, 2006, p. 552, Table 8.2. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Accessed at: https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/committees/listofcommittees/pages/committees.aspx?h=la [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. *Charter of Reform*, p. 7 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. *Charter of Reform*, p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. *Charter of Reform*, p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Figures collated from the *Index to the Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly* [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. *Policy*, Summer 1996-97 edition, pp. 34-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)